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Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme that allows computations to be evaluated on
encrypted inputs without knowledge of their raw messages. Recently Ouyang et al. constructed
a quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) scheme for Clifford circuits with statistical security
(or information-theoretic security (IT-security)). It is desired to see whether an information-
theoretically-secure (ITS) quantum FHE exists. If not, what other nontrivial class of quantum
circuits can be homomorphically evaluated with IT-security? We provide a limitation for the first
question that an ITS quantum FHE necessarily incurs exponential overhead. As for the second one,
we propose a QHE scheme for the instantaneous quantum polynomial-time (IQP) circuits. Our
QHE scheme for IQP circuits follows from the one-time pad.
I. INTRODUCTION
Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme that allows computation to be evaluated on encrypted inputs
without knowledge of their raw messages. An encryption scheme is typically considered as a computational primitive,
since an information-theoretically-secure (ITS for short) symmetric key encryption scheme can only securely encrypt
messages of length at most the length of the secret key by Shannon’s impossibility result [1, 2]. However, homomorphic
encryptions can be interesting even with a bounded number of encrypted messages. Unfortunately, classical ITS fully
homomorphic encryptions do not exist [3].
In this work we investigate the possibility of ITS symmetric-key homomorphic encryptions in the quantum setting.
The quantum analogue of Shannon’s impossibility result says that no quantum encryption scheme with information-
theoretic security (IT-security) can encrypt a message much longer than the secret key [4–6]. In light of the negative
result, we consider ITS symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) with bounded-message security. Such
a QHE scheme is called IT Nκ bounded-message secure (IT Nκ-BMS) for a security parameter κ (see Def. 3). We
remark that security with respect to chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) where an adversary has access to an encryption
oracle is usually considered in the computational setting [7, 8]; however, CPA security cannot hold in the information-
theoretic setting due to Shannon’s impossibility results.
If a QHE scheme supports homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary quantum computation, it is called a quantum
fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme. For this, homomorphic evaluation of a universal set of gates need
to be implemented efficiently. It is known that Clifford gates together with the T gate are universal for quantum
computation. The Clifford gates are composed of Hadamard, phase, and controlled-NOT CNOT = |0〉〈0|⊗I+ |1〉〈1|⊗
X . (Pauli matrices are denoted by I, X , Y , and Z.)
In the computational setting, there has been an exciting development of QHE, initiated by the seminal work
of Broadbent and Jeffery [7], who constructed (computationally secure) QHE schemes for Clifford circuits with a
small number of T gates. The first (leveled) QFHE is constructed by Dulek, Schaffner, and Speelman [8] based on
the learning with error (LWE) assumption. However, their scheme requires a large quantum evaluation key that is
consumed in the homomorphic evaluation. Alagic et al. [9] showed how to further achieve verifiability for QFHE, which
allows verification of correctness of homomorphically evaluated ciphertexts. Very recently, Mahadev [10] constructed a
new QFHE scheme that significantly improved the result of [8] by removing the quantum evaluation key. Furthermore,
the scheme of Mahadev [10] produces classical ciphertexts when the underlying message is classical, which allows a
classical client to delegate quantum computation to a quantum server without revealing his classical input.
A natural question is: can we build a QFHE scheme with IT-security? The possibility was first investigated by
Ouyang et al. [11] and they showed that ITS QHE can be performed for Clifford circuits. On the other hand, it has
been shown by Yu et al. [12] that QFHE with perfect security must incur an exponential overhead. Herein, we extend
the result to QFHE with imperfect IT-security by a reduction to the communication lower bound of quantum private
information retrieval (QPIR) [13, 14]. (Please see Theorem 5.) This limitation is also independently observed by
Newman and Shi [15]. As a consequence, ITS QFHE does not exist.
The next question is whether we can have ITS QHE for any nontrivial class of circuits other than the Clifford
circuits. In [11] a class of Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [16, 17] with transversal Clifford gates are used to
construct an ITS QHE scheme. Quantum codes are used in the setting of fault-tolerant quantum computation [18] and
quantum cryptography (e.g., [19–23]). Therefore, if we replace those CSS codes by codes with a different transversal
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2gate set, we obtain an ITS QHE scheme for another class of circuits. For example, the triorthogonal codes [24] have
transversal CNOT, T , and control-control-phase gates. (However, it is known that transversal gates alone cannot be
universal for quantum codes [25, 26]. See more discussion about transversal computation in [15].)
In this paper we show how to do QHE for the instantaneous quantum polynomial-time (IQP) circuits [27]. Note
that the encrypted messages to IQP are restricted to the those density operators without any single Pauli Z in the
Pauli decomposition. See Def. 6 and the discussions there. We will propose a QHE scheme F for IQP based on Z
one-time pads.
The notion of IQP computation was proposed in [27], which is not universal for quantum computation. It is known
that the class of IQP with postselection is equivalent to the class PP [28]. Moreover, IQP computations are difficult
to simulate with classical computers [28–30] unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level. Currently it
is hard to implement Shor’s factoring algorithm [31]. Instead, nonuniversal circuits, such as IQP, are physically more
feasible so that quantum supremacy could be demonstrated [30, 32–34]. In contrast, a Clifford circuit with input
states in the computational basis can be classically simulated by the Gottesman-Knill theorem [35].
This paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in the next section, including basics of quantum infor-
mation processing. In Sec. III we define QHE and its properties and then provide the limitation of IT-secure QFHE
in Sec. IV. In Sec. V we discuss IQP circuits and propose the QHE scheme F. Then we conclude.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We give notation and briefly introduce basics of quantum mechanics here. A quantum system will be denoted by
a capital letter and its corresponding Hilbert space will be denoted by the corresponding calligraphic letter.
Let L(H) denote the space of linear operators on a complex Hilbert space H. A quantum system is described by
a density operator ρ ∈ L(H) that is positive semidefinite and with trace one trρ = 1. Let D(H) = {ρ ∈ L(H) : ρ ≥
0, trρ = 1} be the set of density operators on a H. When ρ ∈ D(H) is of rank one, it is called a pure quantum state
and we can write ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| for some unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ H, where 〈ψ| = |ψ〉† is the conjugate transpose of |ψ〉. If ρ
is not pure, it is called a mixed state and can be expressed as a convex combination of pure quantum states. The
Hilbert space of a joint quantum system AB is the tensor product of the corresponding Hilbert spaces A⊗B. We use
ρMR to denote a density operator for the joint of the message (M) and reference (R) systems.
The trace distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is
||ρ− σ||tr,
where ||X ||tr = 12 tr
√
X†X is the trace norm of an operator X .
Associated with an m-qubit quantum system is a complex Hilbert space C2
m
with a computational basis {|v〉 : v ∈
{0, 1}m}. Let {|0〉, |1〉} be an ordered basis for pure single-qubit states in C2. The Pauli matrices
σ0 = I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, σ1 = X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, σ3 = Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, σ2 = Y = iXZ
form a basis of L(C2). Then any single-qubit density operator ρ ∈ D(C2) admits a Bloch sphere representation
ρ =
I + r1X + r2Y + r3Z
2
,
I + ~r · ~σ
2
, (1)
where ~σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) and ~r = (r1, r2, r3) ∈ R3 is called the Bloch vector of ρ such that r21 + r22 + r23 ≤ 1. If ρ is pure,
we have r21 + r
2
2 + r
2
3 = 1.
The evolution of a quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) is described by a quantum operation E : D(H) → D(H′) for some
Hilbert spaces H and H′. In particular, if the evolution is a unitary U , we have the evolved state E(ρ) = UρU †. A
quantum operation of several single-qubit Pauli operators on n different qubits simultaneously can be realized as an
n-fold Pauli operator. Denote the n-fold Pauli group by
Gn = {icE1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ En : c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, Ej ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}}.
All elements in Gn are unitary with eigenvalues ±1 and they either commute or anticommute with each other. An n-
fold Pauli operator admits a binary representation that is irrelevant to its phase. For two binary n-tuples u, v ∈ {0, 1}n,
3define
ZuXv =
n⊗
j=1
ZujXvj .
where u = u1 · · ·un and v = v1 · · · vn. Thus any g ∈ Gn can be expressed as g = icZuXv for some c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and
u, v ∈ {0, 1}n.
The set of unitary operators in L(C2
n
) that preserve the n-fold Pauli group Gn by conjugation is the Clifford group,
which is generated by the Hadamard (H), phase (P ) and controlled-NOT (CNOT) gates:
H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, P =
[
1 0
0 i
]
, CNOT = |0〉〈0| ⊗ I + |1〉〈1| ⊗X.
The gates H , P , and CNOT are called Clifford gates. It is known that circuits composed of only Clifford gates are
not universal; the Clifford gates together with any gate outside the Clifford group will do. For example, a candidate
is the π/8 gate
T = eipi/8
[
e−ipi/8 0
0 eipi/8
]
.
These gates that involve only a few qubits are called elementary gates. Then a quantum circuit is composed of a
sequence of elementary gates and possibly some quantum measurements. It is known that quantum measurements
can be deferred to the end of a quantum circuit [36] and we will assume it is always the case in this paper. Also we
consider only measurements in the Z basis (|0〉, |1〉) and measurements in the X basis (|+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
).
We denote by C(ρ) the output of a quantum circuit C with input quantum state ρ by treating C as a quantum
operation.
III. DEFINITIONS
Definition 1. A private-key quantum homomorphic qubit-encryption scheme F is defined by the following algorithms:
1) (Key generation) F.KeyGen: 1κ → Hsk ×D(Hevk). The algorithm takes an input of a security parameter κ and
outputs a classical private key sk (and possibly some quantum evaluation key ρevk ∈ D(Hevk)).
2) (Encryption) F.Encsk: D(C
2)→ D(C). The algorithm takes sk and a single-qubit ρ ∈ D(C2) as input and outputs
a ciphertext ρ˜ ∈ D(C).
3) (Evaluation) F.Eval: D(Hevk) × Cκ ×D(C⊗Mκ) → D(C⊗Mκ) ×M⊗Mκ , where Cκ is a set of admissible quantum
circuits for F and the security parameter κ, Mκ is the maximum number of input qubits for Cκ, and M is the set
of corresponding homomorphic measurement outcomes.
4) (Decryption) F.Decsk: D(C)×M→ D(C2)× {0, 1}. If the measurement outcome µ ∈ M is trivial, the algorithm
takes sk and σ ∈ D(C) as input and outputs a single-qubit quantum state σˆ ∈ D(C2). Otherwise, the algorithm
takes sk and µ as input and outputs a bit of measurement outcome.
- (Correctness) F is homomorphic for C = ∪κCκ if there exists a negligible function η(κ) such that for sk, ρevk ←
F.KeyGen(1κ), C ∈ Cκ on Mκ qubits, and ρMR ∈ D(C2Mκ ⊗R),
∥∥∥Φsk,Mκ
F.Dec ⊗ IR
(
Φρevk,C
F.Eval ⊗ IR
(
Φsk,Mκ
F.Enc ⊗ IR(ρMR)
))
− C ⊗ IR(ρMR)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ η(κ),
where Φ denotes the corresponding quantum operation of the underlying algorithm and R is a reference system.
- (Compactness) F is compact for C = ∪κCκ if there exists a polynomial p in κ such that for any C ∈ Cκ, the circuit
complexity of applying F.Dec to the output of F.EvalC is at most p(κ).
A QHE scheme is fully homomorphic if it is compact and homomorphic for all quantum circuits generated by a
universal set of quantum gates.
4Definition 2. A QHE scheme F is information-theoretically Nκ-bounded-message-secure (IT Nκ-BMS) if there exists
a negligible function ǫ(κ), such that for every security parameter κ and ρMR, ρ
′
MR ∈ D(C2
Nκ ⊗R) with trM (ρMR) =
trM (ρ
′
MR), ∥∥∥Φsk,Nκ
F.Enc ⊗ IR(ρMR)− Φsk,NκF.Enc ⊗ IR(ρ′MR)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ(κ), (2)
where Φ denotes the corresponding quantum operation of the underlying algorithm.
This definition says that two encrypted quantum states of an IT-secure QHE are statistically indistinguishable.
Below is a weaker definition of IT Nκ-BMS with no reference system involved.
Definition 3. A QHE scheme F is weak information-theoretically Nκ-bounded-message-secure (weak IT Nκ-BMS) if
there exists a negligible function ǫ(κ), such that for every security parameter κ and ρ, ρ′ ∈ D(C2Nκ ),
∥∥∥Φsk,Nκ
F.Enc (ρ)− Φsk,NκF.Enc (ρ′)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ(κ). (3)
It is clear that Def. 2 implies Def. 3 by choosing a trivial reference system. By [6, Theorem 8], we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. If F is a weak IT Nκ-BMS encryption scheme with security error at most ǫ(κ), then F is IT Nκ-BMS
with security error at most 22Nκ+1ǫ(κ).
IV. LIMITATION
The negative result for ITS QFHE is proved by a reduction to the communication lower bound of quantum private
information retrieval (QPIR) with one server. In an (n,m) QPIR problem, Alice (the server) has a data string x of
n bits and Bob wishes to learn the ith entry xi. They create an initial state ρABR with trRρABR = |x〉A〈x| ⊗ |i〉B〈i|
and after a two-party protocol P they end up with the final state ρ′ABR = P(ρABR) by exchanging m qubits. We say
that P has correctness error δ if for any ρABR with trRρABR = |x〉A〈x| ⊗ |i〉B〈i|, there exists a measurementM such
that
Pr {M (trAR(ρ′ARB)) = xi} ≥ 1− δ.
We say that P has security error ǫ if for any ρABR, there exists a quantum operation EAR such that
‖trB (EAR ⊗ IB(ρARB))− trB(ρ′ARB)‖tr ≤ ǫ.
Nayak [37, 38] proved that m ≥ (1 − H(1 − δ))n for ǫ = 0, where H(p) is the binary entropy function. This was
extended to the case of ǫ > 0 in [14]:
m ≥
(
1−H
(
1− δ − 2
√
ǫ(1− ǫ)
))
n. (4)
We show that the existence of an ITS QFHE would contradict this communication lower bound.
Theorem 5. There is no IT Nκ-BMS QFHE for Nκ = ω(log κ) with correctness error η(κ) = 0.0001 and security
error ǫ(κ) = 0.0001. Moreover, there is no IT Nκ-BMS QHE on classical circuits for Nκ = ω(log κ) with correctness
error η(κ) = 0.0001 and security error ǫ(κ) = 0.0001.
Proof. Assume there is an IT Nκ-BMS QFHE scheme F for Nκ = ω(log κ) with correctness error η(κ) = 0.0001
in Def. 1 and security error ǫ(κ) = 0.0001 in Def. 3. We show that it leads to a QPIR protocol that violates the
communication lower bound Eq. (4).
Suppose that F encrypts one qubit into a ciphertext of at most p(κ) qubits and κ is sufficiently large such that
H
(
1− η(κ)− 2
√
ǫ(κ)(1− ǫ(κ))
)
< 0.2.
Let n = 100p2(κ), which satisfies logn ≤ Nκ.
Suppose Alice holds a database x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob wants to retrieve information xi from Alice by using F without
revealing i. Let Cx ∈ Cκ be a quantum circuit that takes an input i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and outputs xi.
5The QPIR protocol is as follows. Suppose Bob wants to query an index i∗ of logn bits. Using the QFHE algorithm
F, he generates a key set sk, ρevk ← F.KeyGen(1κ) and then produces the cipher state F.Enc⊗ lognsk (|i∗〉), which is of
p(κ) logn qubits. Then he sends it to Alice, together with ρevk. After computing
ρ , F.Eval(ρevk, Cx,F.Enc
⊗ logn
sk (|i∗〉)),
Alice sends ρ back to Bob. By the security of IT Nκ-BMS F, Bob does not reveal his desired objective to Alice.
If Alice honestly does the homomorphic evaluation, Bob would learn xi∗ with probability at least 1 − η(κ). Thus
we have an
(
n = 100p2(κ), p(κ)(1 + logn)
)
QPIR protocol with correctness error η(κ) and security error ǫ(κ). Note
that only p(κ)(1 + logn) = p(κ)(1 + log 10 + 2 log p(κ)) qubits are required in communication, which contradicts the
communication lower bound (4) that at least 0.8n = 80p2(κ) qubits are required.
Observe that in this proof Alice only needs to homomorphically evaluate a classical selection function. Thus the
impossibility proof also rules our ITS QHE schemes for all classical circuits.
V. IQP CIRCUITS
IQP circuits are proposed in [27, 28]. We call a gate diagonal in the computational basis (|0〉, |1〉) a diagonal gate.
Definition 6. An IQP circuit is a quantum circuit consisting of diagonal gates. The input state is the product state
of some qubits in |+〉 and the output is the measurement outcomes on a specified subset of the qubits in the X basis
(|+〉, |−〉).
Remark 7. For the homomorphic encryption of N -qubit IQP circuits, we define a more general input space:
Dxy(C
2N ⊗R) , {ρMR ∈ D(C2
N ⊗R) : ρMR =
∑
i
αiAi,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Ai,N ⊗Bi, Ai,j ∈ {I,X, Y }, Bi ∈ D(R)}, (5)
where R is a reference system.
In other words, Dxy(C
2N ⊗ R) is a collection of density operators that do not have any single Z operator in the
message part of their Pauli decompositions. Similarly to Theorem 4, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 8. If F is a weak IT Nκ-BMS encryption scheme for input space Dxy(C
Nκ) with security error at most
ǫ(κ), then F is IT Nκ-BMS for input space Dxy(C
Nκ ⊗R) with security error at most 22Nκ+1ǫ(κ).
Then it suffices to prove that a QHE scheme for IQP is weak IT Nκ-BMS.
A. QHE for IQP
Observe that an input qubit of a IQP circuit lies in the xy-plane, i.e., |ψ〉 = |0〉+ eiθ|1〉, which can be protected by
a Z one-time pad. The symmetric-key QHE scheme F is defined as follows.
QHE scheme for IQP circuits: F
Let IQPN be the set of IQP circuits with at most N input qubits. Suppose a client asks a server to compute a
quantum circuit C ∈ IQPN on an N -qubit input state in Dxy(C2
N
).
1) F.KeyGen : 1κ → h : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}, where h is uniformly drawn from a family of κ-independent hash functions
Hκ (no evaluation key here).
2) F.Enc: Hκ ×D(C2)→ {0, 1}κ ×D(C2). Encryption is done by applying a Z one-time pad:
F.Ench(ρ) =
(
r, Zh(r)ρZh(r)
)
for ρ ∈ D(C2), where r is a random string of κ bits (encryption randomness). For an N -qubit input state, each
qubit is encrypted respectively.
63) F.Eval: IQPN × {0, 1}N×κ × D(C2
N
) → {0, 1}N×κ × D(C2N ) × {⊥, 0, 1}N . Evaluation is trivial for diagonal
gates since they commute with the encryption. Measurements in the X basis are also trivial and the outcomes
are protected by the Z one-time pads. (Note that an additional register, initialized in ⊥, is used the store the
measurement outcomes {0, 1} for each qubit.)
4) F.Dech: {0, 1}κ×D(C2)× {⊥, 0, 1} → D(C2)× {⊥, 0, 1}. For r ∈ {0, 1}κ, σ ∈ D(C2), and µ ∈ {⊥, 0, 1}, if µ = ⊥,
the qubit was not measured and the qubit state will be decrypted: F.Dech ((r, σ, µ)) = Z
h(r)σZh(r); otherwise, the
qubit is measured and the measurement outcome will be decrypted: F.Dech ((r, σ, µ)) = h(r)⊕ µ.
Note that a κ-independent hash function h : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1} can be described in O(Nκ + κ) bits (see, eg., [39]).
The secret keys used in F are k-wise independent hash functions with k = O(Nκ) and the length of a secret key is
O(Nκ + κ). The fresh ciphertext has Nκ qubits and O (κ) classical bits.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we proved a more general limitation on QFHE with imperfect IT-security, which says that an ex-
ponential overhead is necessary even a small security error is allowed. Our proof is based on a reduction to the
communication lower bound of quantum private information retrieval.
On the positive side, we provided a QHE scheme for IQP circuits based on Z one-time pads and hash functions.
The next question is whether we can allow verification of QHE for IQP circuits as in [9]. We remark that it is also
possible to derive a QHE for IQP based on quantum error-correction codes similar to the Clifford scheme by Ouyang
et al. [11]. However, it is not clear how to introduce verifiability in the scheme. On the other hand, the Clifford
scheme by Ouyang et al.naturally allows circuit privacy. It is also unknown whether we can have circuit privacy for
QHE on IQP circuits.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Si-Hui Tan for introducing their work [11] to us. We are grateful to anonymous referees for their comments
and the suggestion of the trivial scheme. CYL would like to thank ToddB.Brun, Nai-HuiChia, and Wei-Kai Lin for
helpful discussions. KMC acknowledges helpful discussions with Salil P.Vadhan.
CYL was was financially supported from the Young Scholar Fellowship Program by Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology (MOST) in Taiwan, under Grant MOST107-2636-E-009-005. KMC was partially supported by 2016 Academia
Sinica Career Development Award under Grant No. 23-17 and the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan under
Grant No. MOST 103-2221- E-001-022-MY3.
[1] C. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Systems Techn. Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656–719, 1949.
[2] Y. Dodis, “Shannon impossibility, revisited,” in Information Theoretic Security: 6th International Conference, ICITS 2012,
Montreal, QC, Canada, August 15-17, 2012. Proceedings, A. Smith, Ed. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2012, pp. 100–110.
[3] E. Kushilevitz and R. Ostrovsky, “Replication is NOT needed: SINGLE database, computationally-private information
retrieval,” in 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’97, Miami Beach, Florida, USA,
October 19-22, 1997, 1997, pp. 364–373.
[4] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. D. Wolf, “Private quantum channels,” in Proceedings of the 41st Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2000, pp. 547–553.
[5] S. P. Desrosiers and F. Dupuis, “Quantum entropic security and approximate quantum encryption,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 3455–3464, July 2010.
[6] C.-Y. Lai and K.-M. Chung, “Generalized quantum shannon impossibility for quantum encryption,” 2018. arXiv:1801.03656
[7] A. Broadbent and S. Jeffery, “Quantum homomorphic encryption for circuits of low T-gate complexity,” in Advances
in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2015: 35th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16-20, 2015,
Proceedings, Part II, R. Gennaro and M. Robshaw, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015, pp.
609–629.
[8] Y. Dulek, C. Schaffner, and F. Speelman, “Quantum homomorphic encryption for polynomial-sized circuits,” in Advances
in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016: 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August
714-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part III, M. Robshaw and J. Katz, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016,
pp. 3–32.
[9] G. Alagic, Y. Dulek, C. Schaffner, and F. Speelman, “Quantum fully homomorphic encryption with verification,” Advances
in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017, pp. 438–467.
[10] U. Mahadev, “Classical homomorphic encryption for quantum circuits,” 2017. arXiv:1708.02130
[11] Y. Ouyang, S.-H. Tan, and J. Fitzsimons, “Quantum homomorphic encryption from quantum codes,” 2015.
arXiv:1508.00938
[12] L. Yu, C. A. Pe´rez-Delgado, and J. F. Fitzsimons, “Limitations on information-theoretically-secure quantum homomorphic
encryption,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 90, p. 050303, Nov 2014.
[13] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan, “Private information retrieval,” JACM, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 965–981,
Nov. 1998.
[14] A¨. Baumeler and A. Broadbent, “Quantum private information retrieval has linear communication complexity,” Journal
of Cryptology, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 161–175, 2015.
[15] M. Newman and Y. Shi, “Limitations on transversal computation through quantum homomorphic encryption,” 2017.
arXiv: 1704.07798
[16] A. R. Calderbank and P. W. Shor, “Good quantum error-correcting codes exist,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 1098–1105,
1996.
[17] A. M. Steane, “Multiple particle interference and quantum error correction,” Proc. R. Soc. London A, vol. 452, pp.
2551–2576, 1996.
[18] D. P. DiVincenzo and P. W. Shor, “Fault-tolerant error correction with efficient quantum codes,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 77,
no. 15, pp. 3260–3263, 1996.
[19] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett.,
vol. 85, pp. 441–444, Jul 2000.
[20] H. Barnum, C. Crepeau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith, and A. Tapp, “Authentication of quantum messages,” in The 43rd
Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings., 2002, pp. 449–458.
[21] M. Ben-Or, C. Crepeau, D. Gottesman, A. Hassidim, and A. Smith, “Secure multiparty quantum computation with (only)
a strict honest majority,” in 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’06), Oct
2006, pp. 249–260.
[22] A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, “Universal blind quantum computation,” in Foundations of Computer Science,
2009. FOCS ’09. 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on, Oct 2009, pp. 517–526.
[23] A. Broadbent, G. Gutoski, and D. Stebila, “Quantum one-time programs,” in Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2013:
33rd Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 18-22, 2013. Proceedings, Part II, R. Canetti and
J. A. Garay, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 344–360.
[24] S. Bravyi and J. Haah, “Magic-state distillation with low overhead,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 86, p. 052329, Nov 2012.
[25] B. Eastin and E. Knill, “Restrictions on transversal encoded quantum gate sets,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 102, p. 110502,
Mar 2009.
[26] B. Zeng, A. Cross, and I. Chuang, “Transversality versus universality for additive quantum codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 57, no. 9, pp. 6272–6284, Sept 2011.
[27] D. Shepherd and M. J. Bremner, “Temporally unstructured quantum computation,” Proc. R. Soc. A, vol. 465, no. 2105,
pp. 1413–1439, 2009.
[28] M. J. Bremner, R. Jozsa, and D. J. Shepherd, “Classical simulation of commuting quantum computations implies collapse
of the polynomial hierarchy,” Proc. R. Soc. A, vol. 467, no. 2126, pp. 459–472, 2010.
[29] M. J. Bremner, A. Montanaro, and D. J. Shepherd, “Average-case complexity versus approximate simulation of commuting
quantum computations,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 117, p. 080501, Aug 2016.
[30] ——, “Achieving quantum supremacy with sparse and noisy commuting quantum computations,” Quantum, vol. 1, p. 8,
Apr. 2017.
[31] P. W. Shor, “Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithm and factoring,” in Proceedings of the 35th Annual
Symposium on the Theory of Computer Science. Los Alamitos: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1994, p. 124.
[32] X. Qiang, T. Loke, A. Montanaro, K. Aungskunsiri, X. Zhou, J. L. OBrien, J. B. Wang, and J. C. F. Matthews, “Efficient
quantum walk on a quantum processor,” Nat. Commun., vol. 7, no. 11511, 2016.
[33] K. Fujii, “Noise threshold of quantum supremacy,” 2016. arXiv:1610.03632
[34] X. Gao, S.-T. Wang, and L.-M. Duan, “Quantum supremacy for simulating a translation-invariant Ising spin model,” Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 118, p. 040502, Jan 2017.
[35] D. Gottesman, “The Heisenberg representation of quantum computers,” in Group theoretical methods in physics. Proceed-
ings, 22nd International Colloquium, Group22, ICGTMP’98, Hobart, Australia, July 13-17, 1998, pp. 32–43.
[36] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
[37] A. Nayak, “Optimal lower bounds for quantum automata and random access codes,” in Foundations of Computer Science,
1999. 40th Annual Symposium on, 1999, pp. 369–376.
[38] A. Ambainis, A. Nayak, A. Ta-Shma, and U. Vazirani, “Dense quantum coding and quantum finite automata,” JACM,
vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 496–511, Jul. 2002.
[39] S. P. Vadhan, Pseudorandomness, Foundations and Trendsrin Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 7, no. 1-3, pp. 1–336,
2011.
